Administration & Politics
Turkey remained an authoritarian single-party state until the end of World War II. The subsequent liberalization of the political order was a process riddled with obstacles, interrupted by three military coups between 1960 and 1980. In 1997, a veiled coup was staged when the leaders of the Turkish Armed Forces deposed the radical Islamist President, without assuming power directly.
The political balance of power has since evolved into a state in which military coups seem a thing of the past. Since 2002 the moderate Islamist AKP has governed Turkey successfully. To date, the long drawn-out conflict with the Kurdish national movement remains unresolved, although significant shifts seem to be taking place.
The current President of the Republic is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, voted in as President on 10 August 2014. Erdoğan, who was Prime Minister from 2003 to 2014, in recent years paved the way for a presidential system similar to the American and Franco-Russian model.
In spite of the Gezi protests in May-June 2013, allegations of corruption against Erdoğan, his family, and members of his government—as well as a bitter power struggle between the government and the followers of Pennsylvania-based religious leader Fethullah Gülen—the opposition proved unable to stop Erdoğan’s march to the Presidency. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, the candidate fielded jointly by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the right-wing National Movement Party (MHP), garnered only 38.4 percent of the vote. Selahattin Demirtaș, representing the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), won just under 10 percent of the vote, which was a strong result, at the national level, for a politician associated with the Kurdish movement.
As the head of the state and the Army, the President does not have executive authority in the strict sense of the word; rather, he has a great symbolic authority. However, before the 2014 Presidential election, Erdoğan had stated clearly that he did not intend to limit himself to the largely ceremonial role played by his predecessors. His focus was on the general elections,that were held by June 2015. To change the constitution and officially grant the presidency the executive powers Erdoğan seeks, the government will need the backing of at least two-thirds of the members of the next parliament.
During the 1970s and 1990s coalition governments were often weak, leaving the Army with much room for manoeuvre. The internal fragmentation of the Turkish political space in the 1990s is one of the factors that enabled the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan to sweep to power, by winning most of the votes, with an increase from 34.6 percent in 2002 to 49.9 percent in 2011.
The executive branch is headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (born 1954), who received diplomas from a school for the training of imams and preachers and from the School of Economics and Commercial Sciences. He was mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998, and was imprisoned for four months in 1999. In 2001, he established the Justice and Development Party, following a split in the Islamic movement, that was led for a long time by engineer Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011). Even though his authority was not challenged by the party of which he was the charismatic pillar, Erdoğan ran a government that was home to many orientations, ranging from the ultranationalism of Minister of Interior İdris Naim Şahin (born 1956) to the liberalism of deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç (born 1948). As a result of the weakening of the Army after 2007, when many of its senior officers were imprisoned, and the Constitutional Court, which acted as a censorship authority in many legal and legislative domains between 1980 and 2000, the executive body came to wield vast authority.
Ahmet Davutoğlu (Erdoğan’s foreign Minister since 2009) succeeded Erdoğan in August 2014. Before his post as foreign Minister, Davutoğlu served as adviser to Erdoğan.
In June 2012, the 550 seats in the Grand National Assembly were held by 326 deputies of the Justice and Development Party, 135 of the Republican People’s Party (social democratic), 51 of the Nationalist Movement Party (far-right), 29 of the Peace and Democracy Party (Kurdish), and 7 independents. Two seats remain vacant. The President of the Republic may veto, only once, a law passed by the Assembly and is entitled, in case of a continuing dispute, to submit a claim to the Constitutional Court.
The Legal System
the justice system is generally independent, it is also highly politicized and manipulated by ideology, and it is possible to interpret restrictive laws in a more or less repressive way. For example, 12,897 of the 35,117 people who were convicted worldwide of ‘terrorist crimes’ between 2001 and 2011 were in Turkey. In the Turkish case, ‘terrorist’ refers to demonstrating students, Kurdish mayors, university professors, and journalists. These accused were often tried by courts with special jurisdiction. The abolition of such courts is currently being studied.
The Turkish legal system owes its origins to the administrative reforms of the Tanzimat (‘Reorganizations’) of 1839-1876, the codification undertaken by Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895), during the reign of Abdülhamid II, and the radical reforms that took place at the beginning of the Kemalist Republic, under the leadership of Mahmud Esad Bozkurt (1892-1943), Minister of Economy and then Minister of Justice, who strongly opposed the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The main legal documents of the Kemalist Republic were the 1924 Constitution, the Civil Code of 1926 – considered a conservative adaptation of the Swiss Civil Code – and the penal code inspired by that adopted by the Fascist Italy at the time. Although the Constitution was thoroughly modified in 1961 and 1982, these documents were modified little in principle and constrained the Turkish legal space until the end of the 1990s.
The associate membership of Turkey in the European Union and the 2010 referendum amending several articles of the Constitution have provided some relief from the repressive measures of the legal system, both civil (equal status and shared responsibility within families) and penal (removal of many articles restricting freedom of expression and granting total immunity to the military). These reforms, however, did not allow complete liberalization: Article 301 of the Penal Code criminalizes ‘insults to the Turkish nation’ (which can be charged whenever the subject of the recognition of the Armenian genocide is raised), and the anti-terrorist law may lead to the charges against virtually any dissident. Regardless of the nature of the legal texts, control over agents of the state remains insufficient: thousands of violations of human rights, many of which are attributed to the state, were reported by Human Rights Watch. The Diyarbakır branch of the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği) reported on 4 June 2012 that 171 children were killed during the ten-year rule of the Justice and Development Party.
Finally, even though Turkey has, since the end of Kemalist rule, stipulated a separation of powers and granted – except during some periods – independence to judges, it has failed to limit the arbitrary power of justice. As illustrated by the lawsuits against Professor Muazzez İlmiye Çığ, a nonagenarian specialist in the ancient civilizations of Anatolia and Mesopotamia and the novelist Nedim Gürsel, both of whom were accused of insulting moral values and religion, and Orhan Pamuk, a Nobel Prize–winning novelist who was prosecuted several times, many prosecutors and judges interpret the law in a very repressive way, even though they may not be influenced by the executive. The latest example of these powerful legal interventions is the prosecution of world-famous pianist Fazıl Say in 2012 over his Twitter posts mocking Islam. There are also hundreds of Kurdish elected members who have been arrested or prosecuted in the last decade.
Turkey has adopted most of the international conventions on transparency, the rights to petition and to access information, and equal treatment of ‘nationals’ and ‘foreigners’. It has also signed the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, thus recognizing the possibility of resorting to the law of the country of the foreign contracting party in case of dispute. Turkey has ratified various conventions on the protection of patents and the rights of authors and artists (although illegal copying continues on a vast scale).
The number of municipalities increased from 467 in 1929 to 544 in 1947, 862 in 1956, and 1,062 in 1965. The number of municipal employees increased from 5,180 in 1932 to 45,132 in 1964 and reached a peak in the 1970s. Currently, municipalities have around 260,970 employees, while the central government employs 2,029,185 (excluding state enterprises, which employ more than 450,000). Following the establishment of sixteen greater municipalities, the local authorities have become independent entities with large budgets (for example, USD 3.7 billion was allocated to Istanbul, USD 470 million to Bursa, and USD 76 million to Manisa). Municipalities in the Kurdish regions, which had for many years been largely under the control of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, gained real autonomy, but at the cost of the arrest of several mayors.
There are currently 22 active parties in Turkey, but the threshold to gain seats in the Parliament is ten percent of the votes cast (on the electoral-district level as well nationally), so only four parties hold seats in the Grand National Assembly. Hamit Bozarslan describes these parties as follows:
The Justice and Development Party
The Republican People’s Party
After the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, the party was led by İsmet İnönü (1884-1973) and then by Bülent Ecevit (1925-2006). The party experienced a major internal crisis between 1980 and 2000, especially under the leadership of Deniz Baykal (born 1938) and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (born 1948). The party is supported by about 25 percent of the voters, reportedly including many Alevis.
The Peace and Democracy Party
The Nationalist Movement Party
There are many right- and left-wing parties, such as the Felicity Party (Islamist), the neo-nationalist (Ulusalcı) camp (‘nationalist’, Kemalist, and secularist), and illegal radical left-wing parties.
The chief of the defence staff does not report to the minister of defence, so the army has always been completely autonomous, managing its own business, promotions, and purges. This autonomy is now being restricted, and the army no longer plays a direct political role, although it does play a major role in national security and is considered one of the five main economic powers in the country, thanks to OYAK, the Army Mutual Aid Association.
From 1908 until the beginning of 2010, the institution of the military – as a single corps or as groups of dissident officers – played a central role in the Ottoman and Turkish political system. In July 1908, the revolution of the officer members of the Committee of Union and Progress in Macedonia, who threatened to advance on the capital, led to the restoration of the Ottoman constitution that had been suspended since 1877. A year later, the Army of Action, which was formed in the Balkans, bloodily suppressed the ‘counter-revolution’ of the enlisted men against their senior officers in Istanbul and led to the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The third of this series of military interventions was carried out by the officers of the Committee of Union and Progress. They organized a coup d’état after the defeat of the Ottomans in the First Balkan War (25 January 1913), leading to the establishment of a single-party system ruled by a triumvirate consisting of Talaat Pasha (1874-1921), the minister of interior (and the prime minister as of 1916), Djemal Pasha (1872-1922), the minister of marine, and Enver Pasha (1881-1922), the minister of war.
The defeat of the Ottomans (at the end of October 1918) led to the almost complete destruction of the Army and the emergence of more or less private militias. The Turkish War of Independence – led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (1881-1938) – between 1919 and 1922 against the Greek occupation of Anatolia allowed the establishment of a centralized state with authority over the military. However, the multiparty period that began after World War II (in which Turkey did not participate) witnessed the formation of many illegal military committees and three coups d’état followed by military governments (1960-1961, 1971-1973, 1980-1983). The army continued to exercise real authority over civil governments between 1980 and 2000 and took direct charge of Kurdish politics and Islamic reactionism (irtica). In 2001 the army established the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a conservative Islamist party that came to power in 2002 and faced constant pressure, before losing the battle for dominance in 2007. The discovery of tens of thousands of documents that proved the army’s preparations for abortive coups d’état caused a great stir in public opinion; this was an unprecedented event in the history of Turkey and led to the arrest of many generals, some of whom are still in prison.